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Big Tech companies have recently led and financed projects that claim to 
use datafication for the “social good”. This article explores what kind of 
social good it is that this sort of datafication engenders. Through the analysis 
of corporate public communications and patent applications, it finds that 
these initiatives hinge on the reconfiguration of social good as datafied, 
probabilistic, and profitable. These features, the article argues, are better 
understood within the framework of data colonialism. Rethinking “doing 
good” as a facet of data colonialism illuminates the inherent harm to 
freedom these projects produce and why, in order to “give”, Big Tech must 
often take away.  
 




The Covid-19 crisis has created unprecedented opportunities for those with large 
data processing resources to claim a privileged position to offer social solutions, whether 
via contact tracing apps (Newton, 2020), AI in managing scarce health resources (Hao, 
2020), or AI-driven population tracking (Lewis, Conn & Pegg, 2020). Yet the idea of using 
data-driven computational systems for social benefit predates (and will survive) the 
coronavirus pandemic. Part of the initiatives previously named “digital humanitarianism” 
(Meier, 2015) and “Big Data for development” (Hilbert, 2016) have been recently bundled 
under the expression “social good” (ITU, 2020). While no precise numerical estimate exists 
of such initiatives, they appear to have grown hugely. Consider the number of academic 
papers on “AI for social good” (AI4SG), which according to one count increased by more 
than tenfold, from 18 in 2008 to 246 in 2019 (Shi, Wang & Fang, 2020, p. 5). AI4SG 
projects tackle problems as distinct as diagnosing crop diseases and “empowering” 
refugees (Chui et al., 2018). But they all hinge on datafication: the conversion of ever more 
aspects of life into data for “intelligent” algorithmic mining and semi-autonomous 
decision-making (van Dijck, 2014). 
 
This article explores what kind of social good it is that datafication may engender. 
If the production of social good as a reference-point for knowledge and policy is a crucial 
aspect of how social reality is constructed at all times, the articulation of social good within 
particular regimes of knowledge is as important today as in relation to the expanding 
philanthropy and social intervention that accompanied the emergence of statistical 
knowledges in 19th century Europe.1 We discuss specific actors in the vast datafication 
landscape: Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Amazon and IBM, whose social good initiatives 
affect various sorts of vulnerable populations. Drawing mostly on their public 
communications and patents fillings, we propose that Big Tech instantiate a quite specific 
kind of social good that applies large-scale commercial datafication technologies to 
problems that are neither commercial nor necessarily datafiable. 
 
1 The emergence of the welfare state in UK, for example, is connected to the 
reconfiguration of poverty as a statistical object that could be measured, located and 
stratified through surveys (Desrosières, 1998, pp. 222–225, 254–259; Spicker, 1990). 
 
 
The article first summarizes the critical literature on the topic, contextualizing the 
datafication for the social good within a broader corporatization of social knowledge. After 
justifying our methodological decisions, it characterizes the sort of social good that 
emerges from Big Tech’s projects. We then offer data colonialism (Couldry & Mejias, 
2019) as a larger theoretical framework in which this emerging form of social good can be 
understood. When “doing good” is rethought as data colonialism – that is, as a 
reconfiguration of the social terrain so that data can be maximally extracted for economic 
value – practices that seem benign articulate with more systemic social harms. Data 
colonialism helps us understand why, in order to “give”, Big Tech must often take away.  
 
Helping the Vulnerable through Datafication: Critiques and Context 
 
This section reviews critical research on attempts to help socially vulnerable 
populations through datafied technologies. Such critiques demonstrate clearly the moral 
failures of these new developments in international philanthropy (Krause, 2010). Yet, it 





A first critical perspective suggests that datafication undermines the basic rights of 
those it would help, continuously tracking and automating life dimensions that would not 
otherwise be tracked or automated. Well-intentioned technologies and practices of 
categorization amplify existing vulnerabilities, even when they work well (Jacobsen, 
2015). Invasive biometric registration of refugees, for instance, may increase the 
accountability of humanitarian organizations, but this ignores the potential privacy 
breaches for unprotected individuals, exposing them to persecution and harassment 
(Madianou, 2019a; Cinnamon, 2019). A fixation with “innovation” has justified 
experiments with vulnerable people in emergency contexts (Sandvik, Jacobsen & 
McDonalds, 2017), which would hardly be tolerated by affluent people in Western 
countries (Mann, 2018). 
 
These immediate harms cannot be explained by practices and technologies per se: 
they are rooted in political economy dynamics. Discussing humanitarianism, Madianou 
(2019a) cites the logics of accountability and audit, which control humanitarian 
organizations and their expenditure; solutionism, which simplifies intricate social contexts; 
and securitization, that aims to identify and control certain actors deemed “dangerous”. 
Burns (2019, p. 15) proposes the notion of “philanthro-capitalism” to explain how 
humanitarian projects may constitute a “business model and marketing strategy” for private 
companies. In their study of international development projects in low- and middle-income 
countries, Taylor and Broeders (2015, p. 230) note “a combination of datafication and 
privatization” that weakens local governments, expands markets for corporations 
(including Big Tech), and deepens inequalities. 
 
Given that these institutional data practices have been commonly developed in 
richer countries and deployed in poorer nations, many authors see colonialism as the best 
framework to understand them. Some redeploy older definitions of “development” and 
“humanitarianism” as continuing relations of domination between Global South and Global 
North (Escobar, 1995). On this view, North-American and European digital conglomerates 
resemble modern empires, imposing their culture and values from an unequal flow of 
capital and data (Nothias, 2019; Oyedemi, 2020; Anonymous, 2018). Madianou uses 
postcolonial concepts to argue that data-powered humanitarian organizations enact a 
“technocolonialism”, “reinvigorate[ing] and rework[ing] colonial relationships of 
dependency” between South-North (2019b, p. 2). The extraction of data about, for 
example, refugees is not necessarily aimed at helping refugees, but at justifying “the 
funding of aid projects” (Madianou, 2019b, p. 8). But this disconnection between 
humanitarianism and those it allegedly benefits leaves unspecified the precise relation data 
plays in the reproduction of colonialism. 
 
 
The Corporatization of Social Knowledge 
 
The above literature demonstrates how private companies datafy a multitude of 
social actors and relations in particular fields, notably humanitarianism and international 
development, often producing harmful consequences. Yet the corporatization of social 
knowledge is by no means confined to these fields. Clarifying this wider process 
illuminates how social good everywhere is being transformed by datafication, opening up 
new empirical sites to study this transformation. 
 
Data about people today is less a public asset and increasingly privately funded, 
collected and analyzed. This process has long historical roots. In parallel to the 
transformations of social relations required by the advent of industrial capitalism in the 19th 
century (Polanyi, 2001), there was an important transformation of social knowledge, 
through state-backed collection of citizens’ information and statistical analysis (Hacking, 
1990; Desrosières, 1998; Porter, 1996). In the 21st century a new transformation of social 
knowledge is under way driven not by governments but by corporations. The huge increase 
in commercial knowledge of everyday life since the 1980s now dwarfs what states know 
about social subjects (Gandy 1993; Starr & Colson, 1988), a change accelerated by the 
emergence of commercial platforms (Cohen, 2019). Such transformation empowered new 
corporate actors to render social life more “trackable and tractable” (Fourcade & Healy, 
2017, p. 19). This new model of social governance has fuzzy limits. Once a “social graph” 
(Farber, 2007) is in place, no human interaction seems free from corporate intervention: 
the very notion of data-driven intervention implies a datafied social good to be actualized. 
This process, found in both Global North and Global South, is not exclusive to neo-colonial 
conditions. 
 
In this context, the definition of social good everywhere becomes anything but 
innocent, enabling a new domain of privileged social action in which some actors are strong 
and others weak (cf. Andrejevic, 2014). “Strong” actors are those (very often corporations 
rather than governments) that have access to large-scale resources for data collection, 
storage, analysis, and exchange. “Weak” actors are those over whom strong actors have 
privileged power to act. Weakness can take a number of forms: underlying dependence on 
social services whose provision becomes conditional on those actors entering into relations 
of data extraction; possession of minimal resources for collecting, storing and processing 
data; greater vulnerability to the outcomes of data-driven judgements. 
 
There are numerous examples of this within the Global North. Supposedly 
objective data-driven welfare systems are commonly faulty and multiply biased against 
social minorities, preventing people from accessing benefits and services. As Eubanks 
(2018) and Gangadharan (2017) demonstrate in the North-American context, many 
individuals are too powerless to stand up to, and perhaps even to become aware of, these 
injustices. Alston (2019, p. 4) argues that hybrid “digital welfare” states are being erected 
“in the name of efficiency . . . individual autonomy, and . . . the imperatives of fiscal 
consolidation” in which private actors are increasingly important. For governments, 
datafication is “a Trojan Horse” to further “neoliberal hostility towards welfare and 
regulation”; for their private partners, discourses about “welfare” help render datafication 
technologies “benign” (Alston, 2019, pp. 3, 10). These new techniques have thus helped to 
reduce welfare budgets, narrow the number of benefits and beneficiaries, eliminate 
services, and impose “stronger sanction regimes” (Alston, 2019, p. 3). 
 
But broader geographical disparities still matter. On a global scale, a further 
dimension of the dichotomy between strong and weak actors emerges: being a poor and/or 
vulnerable citizen of a country which overall is more vulnerable to net data extraction 
(Weber, 2017). Particular nation-states are vulnerable to data extraction if they lack large-
scale data actors, strong infrastructures for data collection, processing and storage, and 
have weak infrastructures for connectivity. 
 
The result is what Madden et al. (2017) call a “matrix of vulnerabilities”, in which 
some are disposed to be the targets of data-driven programs for social good, and others the 
ultimate economic beneficiaries. The specific vulnerabilities this matrix generates 
 
interconnect with the inequalities inherited from neo-colonial geographies, but they are not 
identical to them. This, we propose, is the process that underlies the datafication of social 
good: an ever deeper embedding of corporate power in the production of social knowledge, 
which goes beyond solutionism (Morozov, 2013; Arora, 2019), because it reconfigures the 
whole domain in which social problems come to be known and need “solutions”.  A new 
kind of actor stands out as the privileged beneficiary of such opportunities: global digital 
technology corporations, which become central empirical sites to understand the 
relationship between datafication and social good. In the next section, we suggest one entry 
point to investigate their global role. 
 
Big Tech’s “Social Divisions”: A Methodology 
 
This section proposes what might be called the “social divisions” of large North-
American conglomerates of datafication technologies (Big Tech, for short) as a useful – 
and understudied2 – empirical entry-point. We justify here our methodological decisions 
and procedures. 
 
Owning to their global reach and market dominance, Big Tech’s decisions and 
actions cut across multiple sectors, potentially affecting billions of individuals in radically 
different contexts and setting standards replicated by countless other organizations. Such 
large organizations provide, thus, a transversal perspective for understanding the emerging 
relationship between social good and datafication. While accepting the difficulty of 
defining how big a digital tech company must be to be part of the “Big Tech” club, and 
how exactly size should be measured, our approach is pragmatic. “Big Tech” here is 
understood as what public discourse considers “Big Tech” to be (Webb, 2019). Usually, 
the term refers to North American global corporations, in particular Google, Apple, 
Facebook and Amazon (GAFA), occasionally adding Microsoft (GAFAM); IBM, one of 
 
2 But see Taylor and Broeders (2015). 
the oldest digital tech conglomerates in the world, is sometimes considered part of the 
group as well. We initially considered all six companies.3 
 
Which of these companies’ sprawling activities relate to social good? This question 
poses some problems, since Google and Facebook have long defined themselves as 
corporations whose goals are fully aligned with those of their users – and, thus presumably, 
society in general. However, by exploring their corporate websites, we quickly realized 
that most of these companies have a particular department within their organogram: Big 
Tech’s social divisions. By this we mean more or less organized sectors within Google, 
Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and IBM that define themselves as geared towards helping 
(typically, vulnerable) people, not profit. While these divisions do not exhaust those 
companies’ actions linked to social good, their common professed intention renders them 
comparable. These divisions’ names may mimic NGO identities (“Google.org”), be 
explicit about aims (Microsoft’s “Philanthropies”), state who they are directed to 
(Amazon’s “Our Communities”), or simply add the term social good after their brands 
(Facebook’s, IBM’s). Google.org seems to be the oldest of its kind, created in 2005; 
“Facebook Social Good” was launched in 2017; the earliest evidence of its materialization 
as a website is from 2019 (Facebook, 2019). The others appear to have been created 
sometime in between. Apple seems unique in that its social good work was not, at the time 
of the writing, integrated into a single department or website, but fragmented into multiple 
smaller projects. 
 
Through systematically reading companies’ websites (using Internet Archive’s 
Wayback Machine) and academic and journalistic research on the topic,4 we reviewed the 
various projects supported or conducted by Big Tech and their social divisions to identify 
 
3 This article does not investigate social good initiatives by Chinese technology 
conglomerates. Due to their cultural, political and legal contexts, they are not easily 
comparable to North-American counterparts. 
4 This revealed projects that, while not listed on the “social divisions” websites, were 
clearly aligned with these divisions’ activities and goals. 
 
those related to our focus.5 We decided to examine 18 specific projects and broader 
initiatives (see Appendix). Our purposive sampling was guided by our interest in 
datafication, and its use to supposedly assist vulnerable individuals.6 While datafication 
sits at the core of most Big Tech products, their social divisions are not necessarily involved 
in projects that hinge on datafication. Often, they appear to work as traditional charities, 
donating resources to other NGOs involved in conventional philanthropic causes 
(education, climate change, disaster relief). Other projects financed by Big Tech allege to 
apply datafication for the social good, but their emphasis is not on the social world but 
exclusively on environmental issues;7 others do not focus on vulnerable people or only 
indirectly intend to assist them – so we did not consider them to fit our focus. We did not 
limit our analysis to initiatives executed only by Big Tech. It sufficed for a project to have 
a Big Tech company as a partner: decisions about how to spend resources collaboratively 
are also important to understand firms’ assumptions regarding social good and datafication. 
Lastly, we were unable to identify a project supported by Apple that was clearly based on 
datafication. One of its largest programs, “ConnectED”, donates devices and assistance to 
schools and teachers, but does not appear to collect individualized data which can be mined 
(Apple, 2020; see also Apple, 2019). Thus, this article’s conclusions should not be 
extended to Apple.8 
 
Given the notorious opacity in which Big Tech shroud their operations and staff, 
researching these projects is far from straightforward. Hence, we decided to collect as much 
public data about our projects sample as possible online. This effort was surprisingly 
fruitful. The documentation we assembled includes documents made public by companies, 
files in which we archived the content and screenshots of companies’ webpages, legal 
 
5 Due to our interest in Big Tech companies per se, we did not investigate philanthropic 
organizations founded by firms’ owners – e.g., the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative. 
6 Thus, we do not analyze connectivity programs such as Facebook’s Free Basics (Nothias, 
2020). 
7 Social and environmental issues are ultimately inextricable, but our primary focus is the 
datafication of human beings. 
8 Overall, Apple has been criticized for its scarce philanthropic efforts (Kahney, 2019). 
filings, and spreadsheets, where we compiled information – in particular, all the available 
data about the prizes and winners of Google’s Impact Challenge. With the help of Google’s 
patents search engine, we used the names of researchers and companies’ employees to look 
for applications linked with the selected projects, collecting all records we could identify. 
Then, we conducted thematic analysis of these documents. Initially, we highlighted textual 
content associated with the ideas about social good on which those projects depended. 
After this, through an iterative reading of these excerpts, we inductively identified three 
key assumptions underpinning the analyzed projects, which defined social good as 
datafied, probabilistic, and profitable (see next section). Treating these three assumptions 
as our main themes, we reanalyzed some documents to extract further detail. 
 
The data we examined are partial and fragmented, inherently limited by companies’ 
decisions on what to make public, and the extent of our searches. This made it hard for us 
to be certain about various factual aspects of these projects, for example all the countries 
where they have been implemented. Relatedly, we cannot independently confirm that 
companies’ descriptions of what these projects do is accurate: we rely here on their self-
interested discursive representations. Thus, we do not claim that those documents (or our 
conclusions) exhaust all facets of these projects. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the 
documentation we collected is substantive enough to ground the unpacked in what follows. 
 
Social Good, According to Big Tech 
 
Our analysis of the selected projects found that, when using datafication techniques 
aimed at helping others, Big Tech companies tend to assume social good as datafied, 
probabilistic and profitable. Below, we explain these terms through illustrative examples. 
 
Social Good as Datafied Good 
 
By arguing that social good appears primarily understood as datafied good we mean 
that social good is generally taken as proportional to and made comprehensible by the 
 
quantity, type and granularity of the data that can be gathered. This might seem tautological 
– projects based on datafication must surely require datafication to be conducted. Indeed, 
the understanding of social good as datafied good usually remains implicit, a too-obvious-
to-mention notion underpinning the very idea of using “data” and “machine learning” to 
“solve the world’s toughest problems” (IBM, 2020). But when the imperative to datafy is 
more explicitly discussed, the tensions buried within that apparent truism emerge. 
 
Take Google.org’s report on the hundreds of applicants to its 2018 “AI for Social 
Good” funding competition. The report combines assessments and summaries of the 
applications to the “challenge” (“insights”) with normative prescriptions (“opportunities”). 
This provides a rare (if partial and filtered) overview of how multiple actors conceive of 
the relationship between datafication and social good. While not a definitive institutional 
account, the report illuminates what social good ought to be, per Google.org. When 
explaining “data accessibility”, the report says: 
 
Access to reliable and meaningful data is a consistent barrier for social 
sector organizations interested in applying AI methods and capabilities. […] 
The data challenges faced by economic empowerment and equality and 
inclusion proposals illustrate the difficulty in collecting large amounts of 
data from vulnerable populations that are often more transient, highly 
sensitive to privacy, and less likely to participate in the formal economy. 
[…] In sectors where data already exists but is not easily accessible, 
organizations that own data have an opportunity to invest in data-sharing 
partnerships and responsible open-sourcing to allow other stakeholders to 
utilize this data. In these cases, it will be important to consider privacy and 
security risks as well as potentially harmful use cases before sharing 
datasets broadly. In more data-sparse sectors, funders can help finance data 
collection. Funders and policymakers could leverage their resources and 
influence to support the collection and sharing of data, where appropriate.” 
(Google, 2019, pp. 16, 17) 
 
 Here dearth of data is framed as a “barrier” that endangers the very feasibility of 
social good. The imperative of getting hold of data involves different strategies 
(“collection”, “sharing”, “open-sourcing”), and even justifies the call for “funders and 
policymakers” to use their “resources and influence” to construct datasets about 
“vulnerable” populations. 
 
Obliquely recognizing the controversial nature of such aggressive 
recommendation, the report reminds us that it is important to consider “privacy and security 
risks”, presumably for those “vulnerable” populations who are “often more transient, 
highly sensitive to privacy, and less likely to participate in the formal economy”. Yet, such 
care seems only perfunctory, given the absence of any hint on what sorts of concrete limits 
should be imposed on the monitoring of vulnerable people and through what gradations of 
privacy. If some people are “highly sensitive to privacy” (added emphasis), it follows that 
others are less sensitive or even not sensitive at all. In suggesting there are two categories 
of rights holders, the report contradicts a foundational idea of modern privacy – 
universality. There is no acknowledgment of individuals’ ability to discuss and understand 
those possible breaches, nor of the unequal dynamics that shape such ability. It is up to 
technologists and “social entrepreneurs” to decide what counts as harmful and how to avoid 
it. What those who they allegedly seek to help and protect think about their own well-being 
is not discussed. 
 
Often, in the projects reviewed, it is not just vulnerable people that need to be 
datafied in order for social good to be realized. Consider Facebook’s “Social Good” portal, 
much of which is dedicated to explain how non-profits can create pages on the social media 
platform to grow “its community of supporters and create more connections and 
interactions with people” (Facebook, 2020a). The portal provides a “best practices” primer 
on how to do this. Its guiding principle is: the more data in relation to a non-profit is created 
by the organization within Facebook, the likelier it is for the non-profit to be successful 
and social good to be done. More data means that Facebook can better profile the 
 
organization and its potential donors, and is more likely to connect them in an efficient 
manner: “when people share interests and ideas on Facebook, it helps you find and connect 
with those who care most about your work” (Facebook, 2020a). But the social reasoning 
behind this self-serving logic is not made clear. At best, it is an assumption that personal 
life is naturally there to be marketed. A page named “Marketing 101 for Non-Profits” 
suggests: “share relevant personal stories from members of your organization that 
showcase their experiences . . . personal stories from your staff, supporters and 
beneficiaries that may inspire people to share their own.” (Facebook, 2020b). The 
possibility that individuals might not want to publicize their lives to their employer is 
ignored. 
 
Non-profits are also repeatedly reminded of the value entailed in using Facebook’s 
data tools. Organizations are encouraged to “know” and “target” the audience of their posts 
by “demographics” and “interests”. We can see this as part of everyday data practices in a 
datafied society (Kennedy, 2016), but it is the underlying assumption in which we are 
interested here: that doing social good is reducible to counting and parsing interactions 
already datafied by the platform. The novelty is not that NGOs need to relentlessly market 
themselves but that the successful marketing of their (presumably diverse) goals is assumed 
to be reliant on datafication processes controlled by one company – Facebook. 
 
Social Good as Probabilistic Good 
 
The idea of probabilistic good also flows from the conflation of datafication and 
any attempt to help vulnerable people. Datafication hinges on the need to transform all 
dimensions of life into data but also on making sense of this data through predictive 
computational systems whose language is often probability (Domingos, 2015, p. 38; 
Mackenzie, 2017). Our point is not simply to say that Big Tech employs or supports social 
good projects based on probabilistic systems (what is far from novel) but to argue that, 
once social good is datafied, its realization begins to be understood as necessarily 
probabilistic. As with datafied good, the assumption of probabilistic good is usually taken 
for granted, suggested in the vague but omnipresent references to “AI” and “machine 
learning”. In some documents, however, probability is explicitly debated, making it easier 
to understand the tensions underlying this conception of social good. 
 
A useful example is Facebook’s “Suicidal Prevention Tool”, through which the 
platform identifies posts about self-harm, have them reviewed by human moderators, and 
show “support options, such as prompts to reach out to a friend and help-line phone 
numbers” to original posters (Card, 2018).9 A more complex view is offered in a patent 
application that Facebook filed to claim intellectual rights over the system. When 
describing how the tool works, the application says how “background” and interactional 
data can “form a pattern or fingerprint which may be used to infer whether a set of 
behaviours associated with the user (s) is indicative of a likelihood of suicide and self-
injury” (Muriello et al., 2019, p. 4, added emphases). At another moment, the application 
explains that the “probability” of a user engaging in self-harm might be an “output” of the 
tool, representable by a “set of values” indicating “that a user may require self-risk injury 
mitigation, a confidence level that a value of [a] classification [of the user as at risk or not] 
is correct, a severity level corresponding to [this] classification” (Muriello et al., 2019, p. 
6). That is, an analysis of different forms of data (including “background” data, i.e., data 
that are not related to the post itself) will never say whether a post is indeed a signal that 
someone is at risk of suicide and should be helped. It only displays the probability that this 
might be the case. 
 
The ethics of designing a probabilistic tool about a social act as serious as suicide 
are pondered in an academic paper penned by Facebook employees. “If we wanted to 
ensure we caught every single post expressing suicidal intent then we would want to review 
every post put on Facebook, but of course that is impossible. ML [machine learning] is 
probabilistic in nature so it will never be possible to ensure 100% of accuracy in its use. 
So the question […] was how can we target the relevant posts and allocate the strictly 
 
9 See also Ananny (2019) for an analysis of the probabilistic nature of this project. 
 
necessary resources for that, while being as thorough as we can?” (de Andrade et al., 2018, 
p. 681, added emphasis). In machine learning terms, “this is a question of how to set the 
threshold” (de Andrade et al., 2018, p. 681): 
 
If we lower the threshold, the more posts that will less likely be actionable 
will need to be reviewed by more people; this poses the risk of having a 
disproportionate number of human reviewers looking at non-concerning 
posts. If we raise the threshold, the more accurate will these posts be and 
the fewer people we will need to do the human review of the content; but 
this runs the risk of missing content that should have been flagged and 
reviewed. In response to this challenge, our philosophy has been to 
maximize the use of human review available to us without falling beneath 
a certain threshold of accuracy. We have thus substantially increased our 
staffing in this area. (de Andrade et al., 2018, p. 682, added emphasis) 
 
The authors are candid: a machine learning-powered tool will never be fully 
accurate, and decisions on how to make the tool more efficient will take into consideration 
elements that go beyond social good, such as “resources”, defined here as how many people 
should be hired to make decisions on posts. Their decision is ethically defensible: instead 
of missing more posts that could be potentially about self-harm, they hired more people, 
even if this made the tool more expensive. Many users likely benefited from the tool. But 
how many suicidal posts were missed by this system? It is hard not to understand such a 
“trade-off” as, ultimately, a probabilistic damage control. 
 
Facebook’s decision to do social good probabilistically entailed necessarily its 
opposite – some likelihood of harm. For sure, no attempt to help vulnerable others can be 
expected to succeed perfectly. What is new here is the a priori presumption that this social 
good project will fail in a percentage of cases not due to a lack of resources but because, 
with machine learning, accuracy (as the basis for doing good) is always, and “naturally”, 
probabilistic. Yes, it is always better to save some lives instead of not saving any life at all. 
However, by contrast with other large-scale phenomena, whose complexity is so great that 
probabilistic reasoning comprises the only possible option (e.g., pandemics), suicide is a 
fairly well understood problem from the beginnings of sociology as a discipline (Hacking, 
1990). There is a different trade-off operating here, hardly explored in the Facebook 
employees’ paper, between using datafication and using other, more traditional and 
efficient forms of mental health support. Facebook could have arguably saved more lives 
if, instead of employing machine learning, it had focused on promoting and funding local 
suicide prevention hotlines, for instance (Miller, 2019). 
 
A further example of probabilistic social good comes from Project Horus, a 
“collaboration” between Microsoft and the government of the Argentinean province of 
Salta “to apply artificial intelligence in the prevention of teenage pregnancy and school 
dropout [rates]” (Microsoft, 2018).10 The project relied on the “permanent” monitoring of 
the habits and the bodies of poor women and children with the goal of constructing 
“complete knowledge” about them (Abeleira, 2018, p. 46, 71). This data was then analyzed 
by “smart algorithms”, which could “allow [the project] to identify characteristics that 
could lead to one of these problems [teenage pregnancy and school dropout rates] and warn 
the government so that they could work on their prevention” (Microsoft, 2018, para. 10). 
 
The project has been criticized for its glorification of total surveillance of 
vulnerable individuals, its association with anti-abortion movements and its technical 
errors (Peña & Varon, 2019). Even without these issues, the ambiguities of how it 
understands social good probabilistically would remain. As one of the creators of the 
project said, “the model we developed has an accuracy level of almost 90% from a pilot 
test” (Microsoft, 2018). What about the other 10% – on what basis can one argue that they 
do not deserve help from government? Again, it is hard to see why such new approach 
should replace traditional policies (e.g., proper schools, well-trained and well-paid 
teachers, universal access to contraceptive methods). 
 
10 Similar “collaborations” were initiated in Brazil (MDS, 2017) and India (Rao, 2018). 
 
 
Probabilistic good defies intuitive perceptions of what “good” means and how it 
can be instantiated. Not because it involves some attention to probability – long-standing 
utilitarian approaches to ethics do also (Baron, 2017), and most individuals calculate 
probabilities of certain outcomes when making everyday decisions, but always on the basis 
of assuming in advance which would be better of various possible outcomes. The problem 
rather, in Big Tech’s approach, is that the association between (probably) doing good and 
(necessarily) allowing some harm flows automatically from the probabilistic notion of 
algorithmic knowledge on which proponents of datafied social good choose to rely, as their 
model for producing social knowledge. In opting to deploy machine learning algorithms, 
they make inevitable, acceptable and perhaps even desirable, that not all people who 
deserve to be helped will indeed be helped. Social good is stripped of its universality as a 
goal, becoming at best the orientation of a probabilistic calculation process. 
 
Social Good as Profitable Good 
 
As if acknowledging the contradictory relationship between capitalism and ethics, 
Big Tech’s social divisions are keen to define themselves as disconnected from companies’ 
business models. Yet on closer inspection the projects they conduct and support seem 
inseparable from the main goal of these firms – to generate profit. The social good that 
datafication can do is thus expected by Big Tech also to be a form of profitable good. This 
assumption echoes one of the oldest and most common criticisms of charitable 
organizations, namely that they represent capitalism in disguise (McGoey, 2015). What 
sets Big Tech’s practices apart is how they create economic value directly out of the act of 
doing social good.  
 
Let us begin with what seems universal to all projects analyzed: their role in Big 
Tech’s marketing strategies. This is evidenced by the decision to both give visibility to 
these initiatives and to describe them in a way that constantly defines companies’ identity 
as driven by moral goals. More systemically, this marketing strategy might be understood 
as not only trying to elevate companies’ moral status, but sanitizing the methods on which 
their business model depends. If datafication can save the world, why worry about its 
hazards? When Big Tech’s social good projects are used as PR tools, we remember that 
ultimately, they serve economic (not “social”) goals. But as such, marketing does not 
directly generate income. The same cannot be said of a different set of practices, whereby 
social good projects are materially associated with each corporation’s business model.  
 
One such practice is the entanglement of social good projects with commercial 
products. This seems particularly true for Facebook, since most of its social good projects 
seem to be built on top of its platforms, and are often subject to the similar technological 
and legal arrangements applied to other actions that happen in these platforms. An example 
is the “Donate Button”, a donation system that collects “card numbers and other payment 
method information, and information such as your transaction history or a copy of your 
ID”, which might be used for “our (or others') legitimate interests, including our interests 
in providing an innovative, personalised, safe and profitable service to our users and 
partners” (Facebook, 2020c, para. 6, 14, added emphasis). As this excerpt of the tools’ 
privacy policy makes clear, the platform might use the data associated with a donation for 
commercial profiling and targeting purposes. 
 
Something similar seems to have been done by Google through its G Suite for 
Education, often supplied at no cost to schools in various countries (Google, 2020). The 
Suite combines many of the company’s leading software services (Gmail, Calendar, Drive, 
Docs, Sheets) and, eventually, its low-cost laptop (ChromeBook). However, according to 
the Attorney General of New Mexico, in the US, G Suite was used “to collect large 
quantities of valuable personal information, without their parents’ consent, from children 
under 13 who are often required by their schools to use these services” (Attorney General 
for the State of New Mexico, 2020a, p. 1; see also Lindh & Nolin, 2016). According to a 
complaint filed by the attorney, G Suite collected students “physical locations; websites 
they visit; every search term they use in Google’s search engine (and the results they click 
on); the videos they watch on YouTube; personal contact lists; voice recordings; saved 
 
passwords; and other behavioral information” (Attorney General for the State of New 
Mexico, 2020, p. 5). More than that, it “mined students’ email accounts” and “used that 
data . . . for advertising purposes” (Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, 2020b, 
p. 5). To the press, the company called the claims “factually wrong” but did not explicitly 
deny that it had collected data (Statt, 2020, para. 9). 
 
If in both Facebook’s and Google’s cases what’s at stake is collecting as much data 
as possible, other projects tie doing social good to initiatives that enhance the buying of 
their products. Consider Amazon’s “Alexa Skills Challenge: Tech for Good”, which in 
2018 “invited developers” to build apps (“skills”) for the company’s virtual assistant 
technology “that would have a positive impact on the environment, local communities, and 
the world” (Vacherot, 2018, para. 1). That is, to get access to any of the apps, people would 
have to first acquire or at very least use an Alexa. 
 
Sometimes, the process of developing social good tools and practices might 
engender potentially profitable non-data assets – more specifically, patents. IBM has been 
for decades the US leader in granted patents, and considers intellectual property a key part 
of its business model (IBM, 2019). The company boasts that “while working to solve some 
of the toughest challenges facing our world, novel solutions resulted in 9 pending patents” 
(IBM, 2020). One such application regards a method to collect digital data about a 
humanitarian crisis (Soares et al., 2017). Facebook is another Big Tech company that has 
used social good projects to invent patentable technologies. Above, we cited the patent of 
its “suicide prevention tool”, but the company has applied for (and sometimes been 
granted) the rights over systems concerning, for instance, donations (Subbarayan et al., 
2015). As a 2019 corporate blog post on Facebook’s “approach to patents” makes clear, 
developing patents is always part of Facebook’s attempt to gain “market advantage” (Chan, 
2019, para. 3, 6). More important than the question of how profitable such patents will be 
is the underpinning assumption that social good technologies – often developed thanks to 
the data of unaware individuals – are part of a wider enterprise, one of whose core goals is 
to generate enforceable and sellable (thus profitable) rights to private property. 
 
Social Good and the Project of Data Colonialism 
 
Our argument so far has been that not only are Big Tech companies actively 
involved in using datafication for social good, but that this involvement achieves another 
hidden and more consequential goal: the progressive reconfiguration of the social domain 
itself, or at least ever larger parts of it, in ways that position those Big Tech companies as 
privileged providers of social solutions and privileged purveyors of social knowledge. The 
social solutions and knowledge that Big Tech companies provide have three features: they 
are, first, datafied; second, by being datafied, they are often probabilistic; and third, since 
they are the output of large commercial corporations, they aim to be profitable. This new 
commercially-driven production of the social good is at an early stage of its unfolding, but 
already it signals a profound rebalancing of power and governance in the domain of social 
life, privileging corporations with large-scale data power and making states (and other 
commercial and civil society actors) dependent on those corporations. The result is more 
than digital solutionism: it is a refashioning of the tools of social intervention so that digital 
solutionism necessarily seems the only toolkit available. 
 
The social good is not a neutral fact, but a set of socially constructed parameters by 
reference to which good and consequential actions in the territories we share are evaluated. 
A corporatization of the social good has consequences for how social life is known, 
understood and governed. We now contextualize this process within data colonialism 
(Couldry & Mejias, 2019) and specifically data colonialism’s deepest continuity with 
historic colonialism: a shared conception of rationality that reduces the human lifeworld 
via a single way of reading the actual “heterogeneity of all reality” (Quijano, 2007, p. 177). 
The proposition that Big Tech, based in one part of the world and benefiting from a very 
particular concentration of resources, can judge how social problems should be interpreted 
and resolved across all the world’s societies is, in the light of colonial history, an 
astonishing usurpation of power that claims the capacity to see all the world’s social 
differences and similarities in terms of one single data-driven logic that justifies corporate 
 
intervention anywhere. That is why data-driven solutions are rarely offered as part of a 
range of solutions to social problems, but as the solution, an expression of a new language 
for defining and solving social problems that replaces all others. No one is asked if they 
agree with this act of substitution of social knowledge, or its consequences in terms of data 
collection and processing. In the process, populations’ freedom to define their social good, 
their version of social knowledge, is overridden. 
 
The data colonialism thesis provides a larger framework in which to grasp the 
datafication of social good. To recap, the data colonialism thesis is the proposal that what 
is happening with data today across the world constitutes a genuinely new stage of 
colonialism: an epochal act of resource extraction that bears comparison with the original 
territorial “landgrab” (Dörre, Lessenich & Rosa, 2015, pp. vii–viii) by European powers 
under historic colonialism. This new landgrab targets not physical land and the resources 
that flow from it, but human life itself, annexing it for capital through technologies of data 
extraction (Couldry & Mejias, 2019).  
 
One specific aspect of the data colonialism thesis is particularly important for our 
argument here. This is the idea that, as it develops, data colonialism transforms not just our 
relations with digital interfaces, but the very ground on and from which social knowledge 
is produced: “under data colonialism ... capitalism begins to imagine away any outside to 
the economy. Its distinctive forms of social knowledge describe a social world that is 
literally coextensive with economic life . . . Instead of “social relations [being] embedded 
in the economic system . . ., social relations become the economic system, or last a crucial 
part of it, as human life is converted into raw material for capital via data” (Couldry & 
Mejias, 2019, p. 117). This flows from the double nature of data as both economic value 
and a source of potential knowledge. As a result, claims about what should be done by 
humans in the social world automatically become claims about what data should do in that 
world, generating future value for the very entities that will lead or aid the production of 
such data. In this way, social good projects extend further the colonizing impulse of digital 
platforms to “produce ‘the social’ for capital” (Couldry & Mejias, 2019, p. 26), not just (as 
do digital platforms) inciting social activity from which the production of value through 
data can be optimized, but reshaping social life as a whole – and the tools of governance 
that seek to manage it as a whole – around the ever-increasing production of data. Levels 
of data production become themselves an index of social good. In this way, data-rich 
corporations are installed as privileged reference-points not only for convening the social 
present (Facebook’s vision of its global “community”), but also for shaping and governing 
the social future (the idea of “Tech for Good”). For that reason, data-driven projects 
oriented to the social good are consequential whether they do direct social harm or not, and 
whether they intervene directly in the social terrain or, as with Google’s Impact Challenge, 
evaluate others’ attempts to “do good in the world”. 
 
The rationality of data colonialism does not recognize a social world where it makes 
sense to consult vulnerable people about how new social knowledges are generated; rather 
Big Tech seeks to act directly on the datafied world that it sees and measures. What matters 
therefore is not whether such projects are done well or badly (Floridi, Cowls, King & 
Taddeo, 2020) but that they are done at all. Simply by being implemented such projects 
create new social domains into which data colonialism can further expand, potentially 
transforming the relations of states to the territories they govern (Magalhães & Couldry, 
2020) and “subordinat[ing] considerations of human well-being and human self-





Colonialism has never been only about the relentless exploitation of resources for 
economic gain. Enmeshed in the project to rob and dominate through violence and force 
was the project to transform the knowledge and governability of the territories called 
“colonies” and allegedly “civilize” their populations. 
 
 
When Big Tech and their social divisions deploy datafication to do social good, 
here too economic and moral ideals feed each other – but differently. For, as we have 
demonstrated, helping vulnerable people (in itself something unobjectionable) becomes 
itself a site of exploitation. This contradiction permeates all the projects that we analyzed. 
The realization of a datafied, probabilistic and profitable social good depends on the 
imposition of certain unfreedoms (in the realm of social knowledge and individual 
subjectivity) as the cost of apparently protecting certain freedoms (from vulnerability to 
particular social harms). Such projects rely on an unsaid denial of individuals’ capacity to 
define what “good” ought to be, and so extend the project of data colonialism. 
 
More than arguing that datafication can sometimes produce the opposite of good, a 
point already clear in the literature reviewed in the beginning of the article, we have 
discussed social harms that are more than an accident caused by Big Tech’s malfunction 
or inattention. Such harms are an intrinsic part of how these companies operate, a natural 
consequence of the rationality – at heart a colonial rationality – now applied within both 
Global North and Global South, that underlies their business model. As such, no ethical 
guidelines can ensure that social good will truly be realized through such projects of 
datafication. This will happen only if the whole project of solving social problems through 
large-scale data processing concentrated in, or enabled by, large technological corporations 
is reviewed in the light of colonialism’s deep and long-standing entanglements of power 
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Appendix: Initiatives and Projects Analyzed 
 
Google 
 Google AI Impact Challenge 2018 
 Google for Education 
 Google for Non-profits 
 Chance 




 Charitable Giving  





 Prescription Guidelines for Opioid Epidemic 
Neurology-as-a-Service 
Cognitive Financial Advisor for Low-Wage Workers 
Causal Pathways Out of Poverty 
 
Microsoft 
 Project Horus 
AI for Health 
 AI for Accessibility 
 AI for Humanitarian Action 
 
Amazon 
 Alexa Skills Challenge: Tech for Good 
 
 
